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THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Technology is the application of science to the uses of man.'
The impetus for technology is derived from its beneficial consequences.
The automobile and the supersonic transport, for example, provide
comfortable, fast, and inexpensive transportation. A river dam may
control floods and produce power. The "pill" and artificial insemination
(AID) free mankind from the vicissitudes of chance in family plan-
ning. In addition to these benefits, however, each technology may raise
problems or create undesirable secondary consequences. The auto-
mobile and the SST cause noise and atmospheric pollution. The dam
may destroy a fishing industry or inundate an historic location.2 The
"pill" may cause cancer or changes in sexual behavior,3 and AID raises
the question of whose genes shall be propagated. 4
Technology assessment is the process of balancing the desirable
consequences against the undesirable, including, to the extent pos-
sible, effects that are uncertain. Modified and alternative approaches
to achieving the benefits are evaluated in light of predictions as to the
future direction of the technology and possible controls on that direc-
tion.5 Finally, a decision is made whether to encourage the technology
in question.8
Technology assessment is currently receiving considerable atten-
tion in the American scientific community. Two national studies of
the process have recently been completed.7 Numerous bills relating to
technology assessment have been introduced in Congress.8 One leading
1 Wald, The Evolution of Life and the Law, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 17 (1967).
2 For a discussion of these and similar problems, see B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AN
SuRvIvAL (1966).
3 N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 8; id., Jan. 23, 1970, at 31, col. 1.
4 See Bravenec, Law and the Modification of Heredity Through DNA Chemistry, 8
J. FAMILY L. 13 (1968).
5 For a lawyer-oriented introduction to the new science of forecasting, see Cetron &
Weiser, Technological Change, Technological Forecasting and Planning R & D-A View
from the R & D Manager's Desk, 86 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 1079 (1968).
0 For a similar definition of technology and technology assessment, see Daddario,
Technology Assessment-A Legislative View, 86 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1044, 1055-57 (1968).
7 COMMIrrrEE ON PUBLIC ENGINEERING POLICY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING,
91sr CONG., 2D Sss., A STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (House Comm. on Science &
Astronautics Print 1969); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., TECH-
NOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT Am CHOICE (House Comm. on Science & Astronautics
Print 1969).
8 E.g., H.R. 17046, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For a catalogue of recent proposals
put before Congress, see Muskie, The Role of Congress in Promoting and Controlling
Technological Advance, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1138, 114247 (1968).
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scientist has proposed that a national scientific "court" be established
to make technology assessments.9 Symposia have begun to appear in
the law reviews.10 Through all of this, however, there has been almost
no discussion of the role the courts play in the process."
I
COURT INVOLVEMENT IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Courts most frequently become involved in technology assessment
when an individual or small group of individuals suffers the adverse
consequences of a technology to a greater degree than the community
as a whole. Although courts rarely mention that they are in fact
making a technology assessment, probably all common law theories
of tort liability have successfully been levied on some form of tech-
nology by an injured individual. People who contract hepatitis as a
result of a blood transfusion, 12 lose the use of wells because a neigh-
boring refinery pollutes an underground stream,13 or are injured by
a defectively designed power tool 4 or automobile' 5 regularly all turn
to the courts for relief or compensation. Similarly, contract actions for
breach of warranty, 1 property actions for nuisance' 7 and trespass,'8 re-
fusal to submit to eminent domain takings,19 and even constitutional
9 Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCIENCE 763
(1967).
10 E.g., Symposium-Science Challenges the Law, 19 CASE W. R-s. L. Rv. 1 (1967);
Symposium-Technology Assessment and the Law, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. Rrv. 1033 (1968);
Symposium-Reflections on the New Biology, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 267 (1968).
'1 But see Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U.
CIN. L. Rav. 587 (1969).
12 Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 NJ. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
'3 Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun 565, 2 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup. CL 1888).
14 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
15 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
16 E.g., Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 711, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) (product al-
legedly advertised as "the all-purpose detergent-for all household cleaning and laun-
dering'); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 1117, 253 S.W.2d 532,
534 (1952) (product "kind to hands").
17 E.g., Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 323 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942) (sewage
treatment and disposal plant constituted a nuisance and resulted in temporary or con-
tinuing damage until abatement).
18 E.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1960) (discharge
of industrial waste products that settled on neighboring pasture held a trespass).




challenges to statutory authority20 have been employed by specially
damaged individuals to force courts into the area of technology assess-
ment.
Three recent Supreme Court decisions on standing suggest that
individuals and small groups will be able to bring an increasing
number of technology questions before the courts. Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner2' created a presumption that Congress intended judicial
review of all administrative decisions. 22 Flast v. Cohen23 expanded the
permissible range of taxpayer actions against the government. And in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,24
the Court outlined the "interest" sufficient to give a plaintiff standing
to sue:
[The question of standing] concerns, apart from the "case" or
"controversy" test, the question whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question. . . . That interest, at times, may reflect
"aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" as well as economic
values.... We mention these non-economic values to emphasize
that standing may stem from them as well as from . . . economic
injury .... 20
The perimeter of this new concept of standing to review governmental
action has not yet been fully sketched, 2 but a number of actions in-
20 E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (suit to enjoin urban renewal agency
because statute authorizing condemnation unconstitutional). See also Pollack, Legal
Boundaries of Air Pollution Control-State and Local Legislative Purpose and Tech-
niques, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 331 (1968).
21 387 US. 136 (1967).
22 "[fudicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut
off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."
Id. at 140. Because the federal government is so intimately involved in modern science
and technology, this holding opens a vast area to judicial review. Approximately two-
thirds of all money spent on scientific research and development in the United States
is spent by the government. Furthermore, many of the technological applications of
science, such as power plants, roads, or sewage treatment facilities, may receive govern-
ment financing and are at least regulated by government agencies. Green, Technology
Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1033,
1038-41 (1968). In fact, it has been estimated that the government directly or indirectly
finances 50% of the technological research and development in the United States. TECH-
NOLOGY: PRocassrs oF AssEssMENT AND Cnoica, supra note 7, at 22; Katz, supra note 11,
at 593.
23 392 US. 83 (1968).
24 397 US. 150 (1970).
25 Id. at 153-54.
20 For example, it is unclear whether this concept of standing will be limited to
suits for judicial review of administrative decisions and constitutional challenges of
existing statutes and iegulations or will extend to actions for damages.
1970]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
volving technology assessment have already been initiated by combin-
ing the holding in Abbott Laboratories with the reasoning of either
Flast27 or Data Processing,2 including one in which a national con-
servation organization with "no personal economic interest to assert"
successfully challenged the location of a federally approved highway.29
When an individual lacks standing to complain of a harm, a
governmental institution, as a representative of the community, may
be able to involve the courts in technology assessment. The enforce-
ment procedures of certain criminal statutes require courts to make
technical assessments.8 0 When the courts are called upon to arbitrate
policy conflicts between different governmental layers in our federal
system, as, for example, when a court must determine the status of
federally reserved rights in navigable streams"' or ascertain whether
a municipality may dedicate parts of the public domain to private use
without state approval3 2 the decision may in fact include a technology
27 E.g., Crowther v. Seaborg, - F. Supp. - (D. Colo.), aff'd, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir.
1969) (taxpayer action to enjoin AEC's Project Rulison). Actions on the state level, where
taxpayer suits were more liberally allowed in the past, point out a range of possibilities
for technology assessment. E.g., Parks v. Simpson, 242 Miss. 894, 137 So. 2d 136 (1962)
(taxpayer action to enjoin state-contracted dredging of tidewater bottoms).
28 See Citizens Comm. for the Columbia River v. Resor, No. 69498 (D. Ore., filed
Sept. 4, 1969); Sierra Club v. Hickel, No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., filed June 5, 1969); Environ.
mental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., Civil No. 1694 (D. Mont., filed Nov. 13,
1968). These actions are cited in Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. Ray. 473 nn.1, 2 & 7.
Some courts had already accepted this rationale prior to Data Processing. E.g., Nash-
ville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921
(1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966); Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
29 The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the controversy are
concerned with the protection of natural, historic, and scenic resources, then
a congressional intent exists to give standing to groups interested in these fac-
tors and who allege that these factors are not being properly considered by the
agency.
Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(footnote omitted).
80 E.g., Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857d(g), (h) (Supp. IV, 1969) provide
for a de novo consideration of the issues by the court if an action for abatement is
brought. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624, 634 (D. Md. 1968).
Criminal statutes may also make the courts mere administrators of a policy set by a
technology assessment made elsewhere. People v. Madearos, 230 Cal. App. 2d 642, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 269 (1964) (conviction for violation of statutory limitations on auto emissions).
81 E.g., United States v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1898); State of Washington
Dep't of Game v. FP0, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
82 E.g., People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n v. Town
of Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533, 446 P.2d 790, 72 Cal. Rptr 790 (1968).
[Vol. 55:861
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assessment. Similarly, a governmental unit can bring a question of
technology assessment before the courts in an action to abate a public
nuisance33 or in other circumstances when the governmental unit
claims to represent the public generally. 34
II
COURT DISPOSITION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT CASES
Courts confronted with technology assessment questions often at-
tempt to assist Adam Smith's "invisible hand" and leave the assess-
ment to the market place. By holding the purveyor liable for the
damages caused by his technology, the courts internalize the financial
burden of secondary consequences. The market price of the technology
is raised,85 and, in theory, the market system then makes the actual
technological assessment.36
A second response that courts make to questions of technology
assessment is to force other agencies of government to make the assess-
33 E.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (defendant enjoined
from dumping garbage into ocean because it polluted waters and beaches of plaintiff);
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (defendant enjoined from dis-
charging sulphurous fumes that polluted parts of plaintiff state). Perhaps because the
government that must bring the action usually has available to it the alternatives of
regulation or criminal prosecution, public nuisance is not extensively used as a means
of technology assessment. Furthermore, the doctrine of public nuisance has a historical
association with the abatement of brothels, gambling dens, and similar places; the case
law is not readily transferable to technological problems. See Sax, supra note 28, at 485
n.45.
34 E.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (intervention by the Secretary of the
Interior in action to review license grant of FPC); Harris County, Tex. v. United States,
292 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961) (action to review license and order of AEC brought by
county government).
35 "Mhe risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business... :' Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion). Actions for inverse condemnation
are good examples of how courts make technology pay its way. E.g., Thornburg v. Port
of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). Some have argued that private nuisance
cases that award monetary damages instead of an injunction have in effect extended the
constitutional guarantee of compensation to private takings. See Roberts, The Right to
a Decent Environment; E = MC2: Environment Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling
Their Efforts, 55 CORNmLL L. Rav. 674, 679-82 (1970).
30 For comprehensive explanations of the economic theory behind this type of
court technology assessment, see Baxter, The SST: From Harlem to Watts in Two Hours,
21 STAN. L. Rv. 1 (1968); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw% & EcoN. 1, 2-6
(1960). Costing-in may either stimulate or retard technology. In a particular case the
new cost may spur efforts to improve the art so as to avoid liability. But in another
case the cost may be a sufficient obstacle to block development of the technology.
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ment. This power, used when a court feels that other governmental
agencies have not adequately considered their actions, has both pro-
cedural and substantive aspects.
The procedural aspect is best illustrated by the judicially-devel-
oped "public trust" doctrine,37 which holds that public lands are
held by the government in trust for future generations and is cur-
rently being used to preserve some aspects of the physical environ-
ment.38 In Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission,3 9 the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that special and specific
legislation is required to alienate public lands. The state legislature
had created a public authority to construct and operate an aerial
tramway. The authority had contracted with private financial interests
to finance and operate a full scale ski resort development. The court
voided the contracts, holding that public land "is not to 'be diverted
to another inconsistent public use without plain and explicit legis-
lation to that end . . . "-40 In Robbins v. Department of Public
37 See generally Sax, supra note 28.
38 Court enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp.
IV, 1969)) is another procedural control on the administrative processes of technology
assessment because it better enables the public to participate. See J. FREDMAN, MATERIALS
ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss (1969). Similarly, the courts have on occasion gone to
some lengths to find statutory or constitutional requirements that the assessment process
be democratized. In District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Aires, 391 F.2d
478 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court found that the District of Columbia Highway Department
had to comply with the public hearing requirements of an 1893 master highway plan,
even though Congress had specifically appropriated funds for the roadway in question.
In Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
the court determined that a dam called a dike was in law a dike, and therefore, under
sections of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (43 U.S.C. § 401 (1964))
and the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. § 1651(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969)),
New York could not build a road along the Hudson without first obtaining the specific
approval of Congress and the Secretary of Transportation. Similarly, a federal court in
Washington, D.C. recently enjoined the Alaska Pipeline Project as a violation of sections
of the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act, which requires the consent of Congress (30 U.S.C. § 185
(1964)) and the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. March
1970)). N.Y. Times, April 14, 1970, at I, col. 7. See also Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n
v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-86 (1964))
requires Secretary to afford residents an opportunity to submit evidence before deter-
mining eligibility of project for federal funds); Meunch v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261
Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952) (statute that allowed state power commission to ignore
recreational considerations in its licensing procedure if board in county where dam was
to be built approved site selection was unconstitutional because it gave local boards
power over a state-wide issue).
39 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
40 Id. at 419, 215 N.E.2d at 121, quoting Higginson v. Treasurer &: School House
Comm'rs, 212 Mass. 583, 591-92, 99 N.E. 523, 527 (1912). Specifically, the court objected
to the use of almost half of the 9,000-acre reservation, to the building of four ski lifts
not mentioned in the statute, and to the apparent subordination of the authority's
[VoI. 55:861
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Works,41 the same court forbade an interdepartmental transfer of
land, even though the legislature had generally approved such trans-
fers when made with the approval of the governor and the executive
council:
We think it is essential to the expression of plain and explicit
authority to divert parklands, Great Ponds, reservations and kin-
dred areas to a new and inconsistent public use that the Legisla-
ture identify the land and that there appear in the legislation not
only a statement of the new use but a statement or recital showing
in some way legislative awareness of the existing public use. In
short, the legislation should express not merely the public will for
the new use but its willingness to surrender or forgo the existing
use.
4 2
The substantive aspect of the courts' power to force others to
make technology assessments can be seen in Udall v. FPG.43 In that
case the Secretary of the Interior sought to reopen an FPC licensing
proceeding to argue that the government, rather than private interests,
ought to build a proposed power dam. The Supreme Court first
quoted Justice Holmes's observation that "[a] river is more than an
amenity, it is a treasure" 44 and then raised the question of whether
the dam should be built at all.45 The Court analyzed the possible
effects of the dam on anadromous fish, even to the point of distinguish-
regulatory interests to the developer's commercial interests. 350 Mass. at 420-24, 215
N.E.2d at 122-24.
41 - Mass. -, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969).
42 Id. at -, 244 N.E.2d at 580. See also Sacco v. Department of Pub. Works,
352 Mass. 670, 277 N.E.2d 478 (1967) (Public Works Department needed specific legis-
lative authorization to convert a pond owned by its waterways division into a highway);
Abbot v. Osborn, No. 1465 (Super Ct., Dukes County, Mass., March 28, 1969) (residents
of Martha's Vineyard entitled to preliminary injunction forbidding Dukes County Com-
missioners from clearing state forest land for an airport extension). Other jurisdictions
have similarly required specific legislation to effectuate a divestiture of public-trust
property. E.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913) (absent specific
legislation, grant of tidelands property is made subject to public right of navigation).
Contra, Marks v. Whitney, 276 Cal. App. 2d 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1969), petitions for
rehearing granted, Civil No. 26,883 (Ct. App., Oct. 7, 1969); Parks v. Simpson, 242 Miss.
894, 137 So. 2d 136 (1962) (legislative grant of authority to Marine Conservation Commis-
sion narrowly construed so as to void oyster bed dredging contract). It should be pointed
out, however, that public-trust property has been narrowly defined. E.g., State ex rel.
Buford v. Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336 (1924) (grant by city to private developer did
not violate public trust because it involved mud flats "having no value or purpose for
commerce or navigation").
43 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
44 Id. at 493, quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 US. 336, 342 (1931) (footnote
omitted).
45 The Secretary had argued before the FPC that the dam was unnecessary (387
U.S. at 442), but had abandoned this position by the time of the appeal (id. at 454
(dissenting opinion)).
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ing between the effects on salmon and the effects on steelhead. 4 It
also considered the effects on other wildlife in the area4 7 and reviewed
various technical forecasts of the needs for and sources of electrical
power in the future.48 Concluding that all of these factors "were
largely untouched by the Commission," 49 the Court held that the
statute governing the FPC required that the licensing procedure be
reopened to consider the issues raised by the Court as well as the
question of who should build the dam. 0
A third response courts give to questions of technology assessment
is to make the assessment themselves. In Anderson v. American Smelt-
ing & Refining Co., 51 for example, a group of farmers sought to enjoin
the operation of two nearby lead and copper smelting plants because
the sulphurous gases they emitted poisoned pastures and vegetable
gardens. The court carefully reviewed the scientific evidence and con-
cluded by requiring the companies to devise a means of eliminating
the nuisance or go out of business.52
46 Id. at 440-43.
47 Id. at 443-44.
48 Id. at 444-48.
49 Id. at 450.
50 Other cases similarly illustrate judicial willingness to examine the substantive
considerations behind agency decisions. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC,
254 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (FPC had not adequately
considered alternatives with a view toward conserving the aesthetic and historical
qualities of proposed dam site). Courts also occasionally limit the scope of agency
considerations. E.g., New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969) (AEC not
required to consider thermal pollution in proceeding to license nuclear power plant);
Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (ordering Corps of Engineers to issue
dredging permit because it lacked statutory power to deny permit for ecological and
conservational reasons).
51 265 F. 928 (D. Utah 1919).
52 I do not believe the limit of improvement has been reached, or that it is
impossible for the smelting and farming interests to exist in the same neighbor-
hood to the advantage of both and without discomfort or injury to the farming
community. On the other hand, in this period of the world, when the right of
every human being to live in comfort has become a universally accepted principle
in American life, I am loath to believe that the law, or the courts in applying
it, will condemn any community of citizens to suffer perpetual discomfort or
injury resulting from an unavoidable industrial nuisance ...
My conclusion is that, if the defendants will suggest a method of operation
that will overcome the conditions complained of in this case and eliminate cause
of further complaint, a decree will be entered accordingly, or if they will suggest
a method of operation or further improvement that gives fair promise of ac-
complishing the desired result . . . .Failing in either of the alternatives above
suggested, a decree will be entered in accordance with the prayer of plaintiffs'
complaint.
Id. at 943-44. In Remkin v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963),
the court analyzed the structure and operation of defendant's plant together with the




Direct technology assessment by the courts most often consists of
reviewing an assessment made elsewhere. 53 Direct actions for review
of administrative decisions are the most common, but courts may re-
view the assessments of others in other types of proceedings as well.
Miller v. Schoene5 4 was a constitutional challenge to a Virginia statute
authorizing the state entomologist to order certain privately-owned
cedar trees destroyed to prevent the communication of cedar rust to
neighboring apple orchards. The Supreme Court reviewed the evi-
dence on available technology in the field of plant disease and con-
cluded that "[t]he only practicable method of controlling the disease
and protecting apple trees from its ravages is the destruction of all red
cedar trees, subject to the infection, located within two miles of apple
orchards." 55 Because the economic contribution of apple trees to the
state was significant, and that of cedar trees was relatively minor, the
Court concluded that the statute was a constitutional exercise of the
police power.58 Texas Eastern Transportation Corp. v. Wildlife Pre-
serves, Inc.57 was an action to enforce an eminent domain taking by a
federally authorized pipeline company against a private nonprofit
corporation maintaining "the finest inland, natural fresh water wet-
land in the entire Northeastern United States."58 Defendant argued
that taking the proposed route would cause extensive ecological dam-
age to vegetation and wildlife and that an alternate route with less
drastic consequences was available. A unanimous New Jersey Supreme
Court held that courts would not enforce an eminent domain taking
The great weight of evidence points to the conclusion that the installation
of the cell hoods and the employment of electrostatic precipitators would
greatly reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the escape of the excessive material
now damaging the orchards of the plaintiffs.
While the cost of the installations of these additional controls will be a
substantial sum, the fact remains that effective controls must be exercised over
the escape of these noxious fumes. Such expenditures would not be so great
as to substantially deprive defendant of the use of its property. While we are
not dealing with the public as such, we must recognize that air pollution is
one of the great problems now facing the American public. If necessary, the
cost of installing adequate controls must be passed on to the ultimate con-
sumer ....
Id. at 172. See also Katz, supra note 11, at 614.
53 See Plaintiffs, Brief in the Profect Rulison Case, 55 CoaNsr. I. RLv. 761 (1970).
54 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
55 Id. at 278-79.
56 See E. PATrERsON, LAw iN A SciENTFc AGE 12-14 (1963).
57 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966).




if the route selection was "arbitrary" in light of the potential damage
and the available alternatives. 9
III
OBSTACLES TO THE COURTS' EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
The passive nature of the courts and the practical and proce-
dural barriers to the maintenance of an action are the most pervasive
obstacles to the use of the judiciary as an effective instrument of
technology assessment. Courts are unable to initiate actions; they must
await complaints by plaintiffs. The politics of existing governmental
institutions indicate that they will take technology to court infre-
quently.60 Individual plaintiffs must be willing and able to bear the
trouble and expense of litigation, and 'the financial burden of tech-
nology litigation may be formidable. Even when an individual comes
forward, his standing to bring an action involving a question of tech-
nology assessment, other than for review of a governmental decision,
is limited.6'
Because of the passive nature of the courts, technology assessment
questions that are litigated usually do not reach them until the ques-
tioned technology is already in general use or until substantial sums
have been invested in it. Private citizens seem unaware of or un-
aroused by the secondary consequences of technology until injury
takes place or construction actually begins. In addition, a court may
dismiss an action because damage is not imminent.62
59 Id. at 275-76, 225 A.2d at 137-39. The case was remanded to develop the facts
and determine the arbitrariness of the route selection. The case was finally decided
in favor of the pipeline company and the taking approved on appeal. Texas E. Transp.
Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 49 N.J. 403, 230 A.2d 505 (1967). See generally Tarlock,
Recent Natural Resource Case, 8 NATuRAL PEsouRcEs J. 1 (1968).
60 In Parks v. Simpson, 242 Miss. 894, 137 So. 2d 136 (1962), for example, a tax-
payer action to enjoin oyster bed dredging was begun only after plaintiff had first
"solicited both the Attorney General of the State and the District Attorney of the
Second Judicial District of Mississippi to bring the suit or permit the same to be brought
in their names, but ... said officers declined to do either." Id. at 898, 137 So. 2d at 136.
See also D'Amateo, Environmental Degradation and Legal Action, 26 BuLL. OF THE
ATOMIC ScIENns 24 (March 1970).
01 For example, an individual or group of individuals must prove special damages
in order to bring an action for public nuisance. Kirwin v. Mexican Petroleum Co.,
267 F. 460, 461 (D.R.I. 1920). See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L.
REv. 997 (1966).
02 In New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969), for example, the First
Circuit refused to consider whether possible thermal pollution of the Connecticut River
constituted a taking for which compensation ought to be paid because the permit in
question authorized only construction, not operation, of a nuclear power plant.
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The fait accompli aspect of much assessment litigation cannot
help but influence the result. In Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v.
Ellington,63 for example, the court refused to enjoin highway con-
struction, although there were obvious violations of statutory public
hearing requirements, 64 partially because $10,000,000 of property had
been acquired along the route by the time the action was brought.
Similarly, Hatch v. Ford Motor Co.65 denied recovery for negligent
design against an auto manufacturer rather than let a jury "be the
arbiters of the design of automobiles . . . not when the automobile
was manufactured but after the occurrence of an accident."6
The judicial method of reasoning seems to have similarly nega-
tive implications for the effective use of the courts in technology as-
sessment. Precedent frequently burdens the courts with historic logic
that may be irrelevant when applied to modem technology. 67 For
example, although a characteristic secondary effect of much modem
technology is the harm resulting from extended exposure to small
amounts of contaminants from a variety of sources, the case law of
tort compensation is largely based on sudden injuries from a single
source.68 Similarly, the historical idea tha a trespass can be committed
only by a corporeal thing has saved many a polluter who emits noise
or invisible gas the societal costs of his operations.69
63 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
04 The public notice of the hearing had announced the wrong date. Id. at 182-83.
See also Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 664
(S.D.N.Y. 1967):
To enjoin defendants at this stage from carrying out the commitment of
the federal government to provide 90 per cent of the necessary funds for this
project would create a chaotic situation. Plaintiffs argue that the damage
to the State could be mitigated, that the rights of way which the State has
acquired could be sold or returned to their former owners . . These argu-
ments do not seem to me to be realistic.
Contra, Boch v. Sarrich, 74 Wash. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968) (a residential development
over a lake enjoined as an interference with riparian rights even though the developer
had already invested between $100,000 and $250,000 in construction).
65 163 Cal. App. 2d 398, 829 P.2d 605 (1958).
66 Id. at 897-98, 829 P.2d at 608.
67 Cf. Miller, Science and Legal Education, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 29, 32 (1967).
(8 For a discussion of the problems involved in bringing an action based on such
harm and an attempted solution, see Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage
Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 3 BROOKYN L. REv. 17 (1966).
69 E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) (no recovery for
airport noise unless plane flies directly over plaintiffs' property); Arvidson v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954) (fluorine gas and minute particles
deposited on and over plaintiff's land not a trespass). Contra, Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (noise); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959) (gas and particles).
The courts' treatment of AID (artificial insemination) is a further illustration of
the problems created by adhering to old legal concepts. In Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc.
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The tendency of judicial thinking to focus on the unique cir-
cumstances of each action further limits the effect of the courts' con-
tribution to the process of technology assessment. Contributory fault,
assumption of the risk, or coming to the nuisance by the plaintiff may
be a perfect defense in a particular case.70 The defendant's ability to
foresee harm, his posting a warning, or his -general intent may either
extricate him or result in punitive damages.7 1 Even the legalistic rela-
tionship between the parties may be determinative 2 Such considera-
tions are essentially irrelevant to the process of costing-in secondary
consequences. Similarly, focusing on the individual circumstances of
the parties before the court invariably weights a direct assessment in
favor of the expensive large scale technology over the damage done
an individual or small group of plaintiffs.73 Furthermore, the par-
ticularistic nature of the case law system is at best a form of "incre-
mental planning" with minimum integration into general rules that
can guide the future actions of individuals, industries, and govern-
ment agencies.7 4
786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948), a child conceived through AID was ruled not illegiti-
mate and a divorced husband granted visitation rights. In Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23
U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954), appeal dismissed on
procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 NYE.2d 844 (1956), it was held that
when the semen is obtained from a third party, the artificial insemination constitutes
adultery, and the child so conceived is illegitimate, whether or not the husband
consented. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963), held
that a child so conceived is illegitimate, but the husband is liable for support if he
consented to the AID. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835
(Sup. Ct. 1964), similarly held the husband liable for support but without reaching the
question of legitimacy. In People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr.
7 (1968), the court commended the issue of legitimacy to the legislature while finding
a consenting husband to be a "lawful father" within the meaning of the criminal
support statute.
70 For the status of such defenses in nuisance, see Seavy, Nuisance: Contributory
Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 894 (1952). Some of these defenses are
available even in strict liability actions. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 838-40 (1966).
71 Although more common in other tort actions, punitive damages may be awarded
in nuisance actions. McElwain v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 245 Ore. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966)
(fumes from paper mill "intentionally" damaged neighboring property).
72 For example, several courts have held that a manufacturer's strict liability does
not extend to an injured bystander. See Prosser, supra note 70, at 817-20.
73 Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82 Idaho 263, 352 P.2d 235 (1960) (damage caused
to a two-acre plot with a cinder block storage building on it by dust, smoke, and odors
from a fertilizer plant with over 1,000 employees and an annual payroll of $1,242,000;
no injunction issued). Only a few courts have indicated a willingness to look beyond
the immediate interests of the parties before them. E.g., Renken v. Harvey Aluminum,
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D. Ore. 1963).
74 For a discussion of the distinction between "incremental planning" and com-
prehensive, or "synoptic planning," see A. ETzoum, THE Acrin Soomrry (1968).
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As long ago as 1901, Learned Hand discussed the anomaly of
asking a lay judge and jury to resolve a dispute between experts on
a subject about which they know nothing other than what the experts
have told them.75 Courts have occasionally cited their technical in-
competence as a reason for avoiding questions of technology assess-
ment76 and have always been particularly keen to accept the results of
assessments made elsewhere.7 7 Today, as the range of discretion open
to industry and administrators is being narrowed by the courts, 78 their
technical incompetence shows through in the form of a hesitancy to
make direct assessments or to order technical advances. In Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co.,79 for example, the court refused to order a pol-
luting cement plant to devise pollution control facilities because
"there would be no assurance that any significant technical improve-
ment would occur."80 Instead, the court awarded damages to the
75 Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REv. 40 (1901).
76 E.g., Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 17 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D. Okla. 1936):
It is a well-known fact that different automobile manufacturers rely upon
the judgment of their own engineers, and it would be an easy matter for an
engineer for a different make of car than the Chevrolet to criticize the entire
mechanical construction of the Chevrolet car. . . . But such a difference in
judgment of the engineers would not be sufficient to justify the conclusion
that the manufacturer, who followed the advice of his engineer, would be guilty
of negligence.
. . . There is no allegation that any portion of the brakes was defective
or that material was used in the construction of the brakes which would make
their use dangerous. This can only amount to a conclusion of the pleader that
he knows more about the construction of an automobile than the manufacturer.
77 E.g., Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391, 398 (1953) ("If the dam
will destroy the fish industry of the river, we are powerless to prevent it.') See also
Scott Lumber Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 388, 391-92 (9th Cir. 1968) (taking of private
property to be affirmed if not "arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith'); Harris
County, Tex. v. United States, 292 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1961) ("unless the record is
completely bare of evidence supporting it, . . . the finding of the Commission granting
the license must be sustained against the attack upon it'); Mahoney v. United States, 220
F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (refusal to find causal connection between damage and
radiation exposure where exposed within limits set by AEC); Bulloch v. United States,
145 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956) (sheep-owner's damage claim for injuries to herd from
radioactive fallout in the Nevada test area dismissed because of failure to show causation).
78 The recent litigation surrounding the Project Rulison underground nuclear
blast is a good example. The district court judge did not enjoin the blast, but despite
AEC assurances he did retain jurisdiction to make sure that the radioactive gases could
be locked underground until release was safe. Crowther v. Seaborg, - F. Supp. -
(D. Colo.), aff'd, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969). Since that time the court has allowed
the gas to be released but still retained jurisdiction to ensure that adequate safety
standards are observed. Civil No. C-1712 (D. Colo., March 16, 1970).
79 - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S2d - (1970).
80 Id. at -, - NXE.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -. Contrast the court's view with the
following statement:
Invention can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy and it can be sched-
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neighboring property owners and specifically avoided considering the
general social interest in controlling air pollution."'
Technical incompetence of the courts is undoubtedly partially
responsible for the difficulties of proof encountered by those who at-
tempt to challenge technology in the courts.82 In all such actions the
purveyor or advocate of the technology has at least the technical com-
petence necessary for its employment. The challenger, on the other
hand, may be an individual without such particular competence who
merely suffers the secondary consequences. Nevertheless, the general
rule is that the challanger must bear the burden of proof.88
CONCLUSION
The passive nature of the courts and the difficulties encountered
in their use make it clear that they cannot serve as society's primary
instrument for technology assessment. Direct assessment by the courts
may be used to resolve special problems of local concern, but even
then the results seem to depend more on chance precedent and the
individual circumstances of the parties than on a balance between the
societal interests involved. Similarly, the liability method of inter-
nalizing the secondary costs of technology seems at best sufficient only
to protect individuals from private damage, not to protect society
from technological catastrophe.8 4 When dealing with the wide-ranging
uled. In the automotive industry, our technology has advanced to the stage
that our engineers can invent practically on demand. Almost any device we
can dream up, the engineers can make.
Address by Donald Frey, Vice President, Ford Motor Company, National Industrial
Research Conf., Purdue University, Jan. 2, 1966, cited in Nader & Page, Automobile
Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 645, 652 (1967).
81 - N.Y.2d at -, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S2d at -.
82 See Drummond & Lyford v. General Motors Corp., CCH PRODS. LiAB. REP.
5611 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal. 1966). See also Korn, Law, Fact, and Science
in the Courts, 66 COLUr. L. REv. 1080 (1966); Nader & Page, supra note 80, at 666 &
n.126.
83 E.g., South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1969)
(to have standing, plaintiff must suggest alternative plan for historic building); Scien-
tific Supply Co. v. Zelinger, 139 Colo. 568, 341 P.2d 897 (1959) (mere showing that
plaintiff became ill after exposure to insecticide does not meet burden of establishing
that the product unreasonably dangerous to humans). Other cases appear to spread
the burden more equitably. E.g., Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169,
174 (D. Ore. 1963) (once plaintiff establishes that he has been damaged, burden shifts
to defendant polluter to show injury unavoidable).
84 After analyzing the problems of internalizing the secondary costs of technology,
some scholars have advocated abandonment of the fault system of individual litigation
and the substitution of a workmen's compensation-type administrative procedure. E.g.,
Baxter, supra note 86, at 58-57.
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effects of some modem technologies, courts like our other institutions,
are still uncertain what the secondary consequences are,8 who should
pay for them,8 or to whom payments should be made. 7 Indeed, the
whole idea of internalizing costs as a form of technology assessment
depends upon a theory of market operations that has been increasingly
questioned in recent years.88
85 The costs of air pollution, for example, with its pervasive effect on aesthetics,
plant and animal life, human health, and even the earth's temperature, are probably
incalculable and indivisible. See Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central
Problems, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 227, 228-33 (1968).
86 In the traditional case of internalizing costs the question is whether the
particular injured individual or all the consumers of the technology should bear the
cost. When courts attempt to internalize the pervasive effects of modern technology,
however, the question becomes whether the consumers of the technology or society
as a whole will bear the burden. Making electric power consumers pay the costs of
flooding the Storm King Mountain area (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 US. 941 (1966)) may in fact be a form
of regressive taxation. See Luce, Utility Responsibility for Protection of the Environment,
10 ARiz. L. R1Ev. 68, 69 (1968).
87 An analogy might be made to the cases that have required that disposition of
public park lands be made for a fair price and the money kept in trust for the
purchase of another park. Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 228 A.2d 502 (1967); Jacobsonn
v. Parks & Recreation Comm'n, 345 Mass. 641, 189 N.E.2d 199 (1963). See also Sax,
supra note 28, at 482 n.35, 547. To date no court has established a trust fund to remedy
the undesirable consequences of other technology.
88 Courts have previously taken note of the ability of modern technology to generate
and control its own market. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 384,
161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960) ("Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that automobile
manufacturers, including Chrysler Corporation, undertake large scale advertising programs
over television, radio, in newspapers, magazines and all media of communication in
order to persuade the public to buy their products'). Some judges have complained
that imposing costs on technology is an insufficient control. In Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1970), Judge Jason, dissenting,
stated:
In permitting the injunction to become inoperative upon the payment of
permanent damages, the majority is, in effect, licensing a continuing wrong.
It is the same as saying to the cement company, you may continue to do harm
to your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it. Furthermore, once such
permanent damages are assessed and paid, the incentive to alleviate the wrong
would be eliminated, thereby continuing air pollution of an area without
abatement.
Id. at -, - N.E2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
Even the direct imposition of secondary costs on technology may not be sufficient
incentive to businessmen. Discussing the efficacy of an effluent tax, one businessman made
the following observation:
True, if you were to base pollution control on a system of incentives, you
might be disappointed. The marginal dollar gained for pollution control is
hardly as exciting as the marginal dollar gained in expanding sales, creating
new products or improving technology. This type of income promises growth
and future profits. I think that many, if not most businesses have a shortage
of key personnel and they would rather use this resource to develop the main-
spring of their profits than to maximize their pollution subsidies.
Letter from Robert E. Kohn to Harold Wolozin, July 4, 1967, quoted in Wolozin,
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When the courts act as part of a governmental administrative
structure for technology assessment, on the other hand, they seem to
have considerable influence on the process. The courts are still passive
in the sense that they cannot act until someone decides to bring an
action, but the recently expanded concept of standing virtually assures
that most controversial governmental decisions will have their day in
court. Similarly, the distorting effects of historical precedent and the
particular circumstances of the parties are largely irrelevant in such
actions. The technical incompetence of the courts shows through in
the obvious judicial bias in favor of upholding an assessment once
made, but the power of the courts to determine who should partici-
pate and what factors should be weighed can have definite effects. 89
Although the burden of proof is still heavy in these actions, occasion-
ally some of it is shifted to the administrators to show that they have
considered all the relevant issues.90
An attempt has been made to categorize judicial activity within
a framework of technology assessment. No longer should a negligence
action be seen as merely a means of compensating the injured and
punishing the blameworthy; its effects on technology must also be
considered. There are essentially three roles courts may play in the
assessment process, some of which they perform better than others.
There is no reason to assume, however, that present obstacles to effec-
tive judicial performance will be with us forever. With the recent
supra note 85, at 236. Since the imposition of secondary costs by a court is even less
predictable than an effluent tax, the effects on technology may be correspondingly
less significant. See Nader & Page, supra note 80, at 673-74.
89 The events subsequent to Parks v. Simpson, 242 Miss. 894, 137 So. 2d 136
(1962) show how court enforcement of procedural due process can affect the ultimate
technology assessment. The court had enjoined tidewater dredging on the ground that
the contracts were beyond the statutory power of the State Marine Conservation Com-
mission. Subsequently the legislature expressly granted this power to the Commission
under limited circumstances. Such projects must now be approved by three-fifths of the
entire Commission membership and must have the support of the Commission's marine
biologist member. Furthermore, there must be a finding that "dredging will not be
deleterious to the aquatic life and harmful to the fishing industry," which must be
"spread full upon the minutes." Miss. CODE ANN. § 6048-03 (Supp. 1969). See also Sax,
supra note 28, at 554-56.
Delay, which is almost an essential by-product of court involvement in adminis-
trative technology assessment, may itself have constructive consequences. The Storm King
Project (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966)) is scheduled for reargument before the FPC in late April,
1970. The author has been informed by attorneys involved that technical developments
in the area of gas turbine power production during the past five years have materially
changed the arguments on the feasibility of alternate power sources.
90 E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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expansion of the concept of standing in actions to review govern-
mental decisions, courts have demonstrated a conscious willingness
to become involved in technology assessment. They may have no
choice; we live in a technological world and, unless we are prepared
to design new institutions and re-orient existing ones for control of
technology, we may soon find its consequences beyond our control.
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